

The Army National Guard: Part of the Operational Force and Strategic Reserve

A Monograph

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Abstract

The Army National Guard: Part of the Operational Force and Strategic Reserve, by MAJ Andrew Chandler, 48 pages.

In 2005, Congress established the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR) to identify changes required to solve readiness and capability gaps in the US military's Reserve Component (RC). The CNGR identified the RC structure at the time did not support the continued use of the RC in an operational role. In 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates established Department of Defense (DOD) policy to manage the RC as an operational force. Since the implementation of that policy, changes took place in manning, training, equipping, and funding practices across the RC. More changes are still required and better management practices are needed to improve the Active Component (AC) RC integration. This monograph reviews changes, specific to Army National Guard (ARNG) capabilities, required to optimize ARNG performance while serving in an operational role. These changes include a more encompassing mobilization strategy, continued equipping of the ARNG in line with the AC, investment in ARNG maintenance facilities and programs, increasing fulltime manning levels in the ARNG, providing predictable budgets to support operational requirements, and a review of the mobilization process. This monograph focuses on ARNG issues and is intended to improve understanding of the issues faced when managing and employing the ARNG in an operational role.

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Acronyms

AC	Active Component
ADT	Active Duty Training
AGR	Active Guard and Reserve
AOR	Area of Responsibility
AR	Army Regulation
ARNG	Army National Guard
ARFORGEN	Army Forces Generation
AT	Annual Training
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
CARL	Combined Arms Research Library
CDU	Critical Dual Use
CEF	Contingency Expeditionary Force
CENTCOM	Central Command
CGSC	US Army Command and General Staff College
CNGB	Chief National Guard Bureau
CNGR	Commission on the National Guard and Reserves
CTC	Combat Training Center
DARPL	Dynamic Resource Priorities List
DEF	Deployment Expeditionary Force
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense Directive
DODI	Department of Defense Instruction
DSCA	Defense Support to Civil Authorities
EOH	Equipment on-Hand
FORSCOM	Forces Command
FTUS	Full-Time Unit Support

FY	Fiscal Year
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GCC	Geographic Combatant Commander
HD	Homeland Defense
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
KFOR	Kosovo Force
MFO	Multinational Force and Observers
MMAS	Master of Military Art and Science
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
NG	National Guard
NGRER	National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report
NCFA	National Commission on the Future of the Army
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NOS	Notice of Sourcing
OCO	Overseas Contingency Operations
OCONUS	Outside Contiguous United States
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RC	Reserve Component
RFPB	Reserve Forces Policy Board
SAMS	School of Advanced Military Studies
TRO	Training and Readiness Oversight
TWV	Tactical Wheeled Vehicles
UTA	Unit Training Assembly

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Introduction

“Frankly, you have to remember that this was a national military strategy for over four decades to not fully equip the National Guard, to not give it first-line equipment, to treat it as a strategic reserve where we would have plenty of time to build up the force, train the people and equip the people, procure the equipment, get it in the hands of the soldiers. It is a flawed—well, it’s flawed today in the light of today’s threat, but in the past it was a very well thought out methodology, but we have been way too slow as a nation to recognize the change that the National Guard and Reserve Component went through.”

—Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force*

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR) completed a final report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense on January 31, 2008. The CNGR was tasked to, “report on the roles and missions of the reserve components; on how their capabilities may be best used to achieve national security objectives.” The CNGR found “indisputable and overwhelming evidence of the need for change.”¹ On October 29, 2008, former Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, signed Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 1200.17 with the stated purpose to establish an “overarching set of principles and policies to promote and support the management of the Reserve Components as an operational force.”² DODD 1200.17 and the changes that followed improved the Reserve Component’s (RC’s) capability to perform in an operational role. This monograph shows that while improvements occurred, there are still changes, specific to the Army National Guard (ARNG), required to increase capabilities and improve efficiency when serving in an operational role. These changes include a more encompassing mobilization strategy, continued equipping of the ARNG in line with the Active Component (AC), investment in ARNG

¹ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force* (Arlington, VA: January 31, 2008), 1, accessed January 21, 2016, http://www.ncfa.ncr.gov/sites/default/files/CNGR_final-report.pdf.

² US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force,” Department of Defense Directive Number 1200.17 (Washington, DC: October 29, 2008), 1, accessed January 21, 2016, <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/120017p.pdf>.

maintenance facilities and programs, increasing fulltime manning levels in the ARNG, providing predictable budgets to support operational requirements, and a review of the mobilization process. This monograph focuses on ARNG issues and is intended to improve understanding of the issues faced when managing and employing the ARNG in an operational role.

Currently the ARNG, along with the entire RC, is assigned two roles; that of a strategic reserve and that of an operational force. In those roles, the RC responds to both foreign and domestic emergencies and supports a range of US foreign policy initiatives. The role of the strategic reserve changed little over the last forty years, since the creation of the All-Volunteer Force. The strategic reserve included tiered readiness and further categorization into the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, or the Retired Reserve.³ In the strategic role, the RC and the AC remain in a reduced readiness posture capable of supporting US foreign policy initiatives with proper notice or responding to domestic emergencies. The RC role as an operational force developed more recently with the mobilization of RC forces to meet the requirements of persistent conflict faced by the United States after the attacks on September 11, 2001. Department of Defense (DOD) policy stated the RC serves in an operational role when it is used in accordance with service specific force generation plans.⁴ Specific to the ARNG, an ARNG unit training in accordance with the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process is considered to be serving in an operational role. Once mobilized it becomes part of the operational force. This monograph analyzes the differences in the two roles.

The descriptions of the different mobilization constructs used in operational and strategic roles for the ARNG are as follows: The ARNG executes an operational role when it follows a “train-mobilize-deploy” construct while participating in the ARFORGEN model. In an operational role, the majority of the training requirements, including collective and theater

³ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 52.

⁴ US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force,” 8.

specific requirements, are completed prior to mobilization. The ARNG executes a strategic role when it is not programmed into the ARFORGEN model and thus must complete a large portion of collective and theater specific training requirements post-mobilization. In a strategic role, the ARNG follows the “mobilize-train-deploy” construct.

After publishing policy to establish the operational role of the RC in 2008 and the institutionalization of the new ARFORGEN model, the Army began the process of maintaining and increasing ARNG readiness to support both strategic and operational roles. Sequestration and changes in US foreign policy affected the Army’s ability to manage the RC in an operational role, but many changes did occur.⁵ This monograph reviews some of the changes and identifies others that are still required to better enable ARNG forces serving as a part of the operational force.

Organizationally this monograph is separated into four sections: introduction, background, findings, and conclusions. The background section provides the significance of the study and reviews the role of the RC from the creation of the All-Volunteer Force to the present. The RC is made up of two components the Reserves and the National Guard (NG). In the Army, the RC consists of the Army Reserve and the ARNG. The findings section analyzes the changes required in ARNG training, equipping, readiness, manning, funding, and mobilization authorities to manage the ARNG in an operational role. The final section summarizes the conclusions of this study.

⁵ National Commission on the Future of the Army, Report to the President and the Congress of the United States, January 28, 2016, 40, accessed February 18, 2016, http://www.ncfa.ncr.gov/sites/default/files/NCFA_Full%20Final%20Report_0.pdf. “Despite the use of OCO funding, no satisfactory long-term funding approach provides DOD and the Army the funds needed to build and maintain military readiness, invest in modernization, and ensure the health of the force. In this constrained budget environment, the Army prioritized manpower numbers and force readiness to hedge against near-term demands, accepting substantial risk in modernization.”

Background

“For about \$50 billion a year, the Nation maintains a strong, operationally engaged National Guard and Reserve force that comprises about 39% of the Department’s military end strength for approximately 9% of the Department’s Budget. The Nation must maintain a Reserve Component that is accessible, available, and flexible to provide operational forces, when needed, to satisfy the full range of potential missions called for by our civilian and military leadership.”

— Reserve Forces Policy Board, *Reserve Component Use, Balance, Cost and Savings: A Response to Questions from the Secretary of Defense*.

The US military's transition to the Total Force concept in the early 1970s increased AC and RC integration but saw limited changes to the RC's role as a strategic reserve. After the continued mobilization of RC forces after September 11, 2001, including the largest mobilization of RC forces since the Korean War, a change in the role of the RC was required. The following is a description of the RC's history as a part of the Total Force. It includes the evolution of an operational role for the RC and the distinction between the operational and strategic role for the RC.

Transition to the Total Force Concept

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird developed the concept of the Total Force in 1970. A memorandum published by Laird stated, “Emphasis will be given to concurrent considerations of the total forces, active and reserve, to determine the most advantageous mix to support national security and meet the threat. A total force concept will be applied in all aspects of planning, programming, manning, equipping and employing Guard and Reserve forces.”⁶ For military leaders, minimal reliance on the RC in the Vietnam War created a rift between the RC and AC as the RC provided a haven for soldiers avoiding the war. The limited use of the RC in the Vietnam

War also appeared to provide greater political flexibility to the President when employing military forces. The Total Force concept supported Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams' desire to ensure the inclusion of the RC in future wars and reduced reliance on conscription.⁷ The use of the RC in future wars potentially forced leaders in the White House to use a more deliberate and transparent approach to the employment of forces. Additionally, concern over the performance and morale of conscripts weighed on the military. Both military and civilian leaders recognized the need for a change in approach to fielding manpower for the military and so the Total Force concept emerged.

Following Laird in 1973, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger wrote into policy the concept of the reliance on the RC as the primary augmentation force for the AC in times of emergency.⁸ With the elimination of conscription and the transition to an All-Volunteer Force, this established the requirement to mobilize RC forces for large-scale contingency operations. "Fully trained, adequately equipped, and combat-ready Guardsmen and Reservists, not conscripts," became the primary source when the nation required additional military power.⁹ The Total Force concept, informally called the "Abrams Doctrine" after Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abrams, ensured greater participation of the RC in future wars and the expected requirement for support from the American public in their use.¹⁰ The creators and supporters of the Total Force policy believed the RC to be embedded within American society thus activation of the RC for war would require the government to garner support for the war effort or risk the

⁷ Barry M. Stentiford, *The American Home Guard: The State Militia in the Twentieth Century* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 215.

⁸ Patrick M. Cronin, *The Total Force Policy in Historical Perspective*, 9.

⁹ Bennie J. Wilson III, *The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985), 46.

¹⁰ John D. Winkler and Barbara A. Bicksler. *The New Guard and Reserve* (San Ramon, CA: Falcon Books, 2008), 4, accessed January 21, 2016, <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-59.pdf>.

consequences of engaging without popular support. It should be noted that, “The all-volunteer force was not designed for a sustained, long-term conflict.”¹¹ The draft, an unpopular option, was still planned to provide additional forces if required beyond the RC. The requirement to mobilize the RC or reinstate the draft potentially restrained the US Government’s ability to wage war, although it can be argued it was not intended to do so.¹²

After the creation of the All-Volunteer Force, the RC entered into periods of inconsistent use. Competition for resources with the AC and changes in national objectives resulted in a status quo. The RC continued to maintain a role as a strategic reserve throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Mobilization of RC forces for Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1990 and 1991, followed by operations employing RC forces in Haiti, Bosnia, Southwest Asia, and Kosovo in the latter half of the decade increased the reliance on and use of the RC.¹³ This increased reliance on the RC reached a potential culmination point in the period post-September 11, 2001 with the conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Noble Eagle. During that period, the DOD looked to rebalance the force and account for the large scale and continued use of the RC. The RC, historically trained, manned, equipped, and funded to serve in a strategic capacity, entered a new role as an operational force.

In his annual report to the President and Congress in 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald

¹¹ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 9.

¹² Kevin J. Crowley, *Integrating the One Army Concept* (Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, April 20, 1998), 4, accessed January 26, 2016, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&docname=GetTRDoc_U2/a345752.pdf; National Commission on the Future of the Army, 49. “The “Abrams Doctrine” asserts that a significant amount of force structure must be placed in the Army reserve components so that a President sending the Army to war must mobilize the National Guard and Reserve and thereby ensure the support of the American people for that war. However, no primary evidence supports the assertion that General Abrams consciously set out to structure the force to ensure domestic support for future wars. General Abrams’ actions were designed to address the strategic challenge of the Soviet threat within manpower and budgetary constraints, nothing more.”

¹³ John D. Winkler and Barbara A. Bicksler, *The New Guard and Reserve*, 6.

Rumsfeld noted both the need for additional use of the RC and a desire to reduce the reliance on the RC during the early phases of an operation.¹⁴ Some military and civilian leaders believed this reduction in the reliance on the RC early in an operation would potentially damage the RC's role as a part of the Total Force.¹⁵ Part of the concern stemmed from the intent of the Abrams Doctrine to cement the linkage between the AC and RC as well as keep the political leaders accountable for their actions by forcing the use of the RC during times of war. By 2005, the momentum for change continued and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) established the CNGR to assess all aspects of RC roles, functions, and readiness. The findings and recommendations of the committee, made up of thirteen members from the House of Representatives, Senate, and the DOD, highlighted the requirement and changes needed to transition the RC from a force serving as a strategic reserve to a force managing two roles; a strategic reserve and an operational force.¹⁶

In summary, the creation of the Total Force concept and the end of conscription in the 1970s began an era of increased integration between the RC and AC. While the changes did not take place immediately, over time, the role of the RC grew as AC forces reduced in size and demand for military actions increased, particularly in the 1990s. RC mobilizations for Desert Storm in 1991, followed by an increase in RC mobilizations through the latter half of the decade increased the use of the RC, but did little to force a relook on the RC's role as a strategic reserve. After the events of September 11, 2001 and the repeated mobilization of RC forces, military and

¹⁴ Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Annual Report to the President and the Congress," Department of Defense Secretary of Defense (Washington, DC: 2003), 38 accessed January 21, 2016, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi/tr/fulltext/u2/a423423.pdf>.

¹⁵ Chris Downey, *The Total Force Policy and Effective Force*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, May 03, 2004), 6, accessed January 21, 2016, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi/tr/fulltext/u2/a424059.pdf>.

¹⁶ Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, H.R. 4200, Public Law 108-375 108th Congress, October 28, 2004, 118 STAT, 1880, accessed January 21, 2016, <http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/PL108-375.pdf>.

civilian leaders analyzed the current use of the RC. Congress, identifying a need to review RC roles, established and tasked the CNGR to report how the RC “may be best used to achieve national security objectives,” leading to the creation of the CNGR and associated findings.¹⁷

Formalizing the Operational Role of the Reserve Component

This section discusses the concepts, recommendations, and changes in the Department of Defense (DOD) and US Army concerning the use of the RC in a role as an operational force after the creation of the CNGR in 2005. This section further analyzes the policies, directives, and reports highlighting the distinction between the RC role as a strategic reserve and that of an operational force. The CNGR conclusions and recommendations provided DOD leadership a guide to change the operational framework of the RC to that of an operational force. While the CNGR recommendations provided a road map, the CNGR authors did not foresee or predict a quick transition. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report 09-898 published in 2009, found the DOD slow to implement the required changes to fully integrate the RC as an operational force. Along with the delay in implementation, the report also identified confusion as to the exact requirements concerning the transition of the RC to an operational force.¹⁸ The current situation is even more muddled as strategic guidance published after 2012 shows a reduction in the references to the RC as an operational force. The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) makes no mention of the Reserve Component as an operational force, instead focusing on, “Adjusting the balance between the Active and Reserve Components.”¹⁹

¹⁷ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 1.

¹⁸ John Pendleton, “GAO-09-898 Army Needs to Finalize an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy for Sustaining an Operational Reserve Force,” United States Government Accountability Office, September, 2009, 39, accessed January 21, 2016, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/295434.pdf>.

¹⁹ Department of Defense, 2014 *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington DC, March 4, 2014), 31, accessed January 21, 2016, http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_Defense_Review.pdf.

Additionally, sequestration reduced DOD budgets limiting funding supporting RC capabilities to serve in an operational role. Finally, the NDAA for 2015 established the National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) designated to, “make an assessment of the size and force mixture of the active component of the Army and the reserve components of the Army.”²⁰ There is potential that demand for US military forces will be reduced in accordance with changes in US national objectives and reduced budgets. The lack of demand could further reduce the requirement for, and reliance on, the RC as an operational force potentially returning the RC to a less defined strategic role. The NCFA released its findings in January 2016 recommending readiness as the Army’s most important funding priority, the continued deployment of the reserve component for the conduct of predictable missions, and the maintenance of the DOD budget at or above 2016 levels.²¹ Only time will tell if these recommendations are implemented.

After the establishment of the CNGR in 2005, government and military leaders analyzed RC roles and the mobilization framework with an increased emphasis. The formation of the CNGR followed the mobilization of large numbers of RC forces supporting US operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and globally.²² The large number of mobilized RC forces undoubtedly influenced the creation and significance of the commission. From the publication of the initial findings of the CNGR to the present day, the DOD continues to implement changes based on the commission’s recommendations.²³ Two significant changes demonstrated support for a new approach in the management of the RC, and more specifically the NG. First, Department of

²⁰ Carl Levin and Howard P. ‘Buck’ McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, H.R. 3979, Public Law 113-291, 113th Congress, December 2014, 382, accessed January 21, 2016, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-113HPRT92738/pdf/CPRT-113HPRT92738.pdf>.

²¹ National Commission on the Future of the Army, 43, 49, 55.

²² John D. Winkler and Barbara A. Bicksler, *The New Guard and Reserve*, 6.

²³ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 1.

Defense Directive (DODD) Number 1200.17 issued late in 2008 established the role for the RC as an operational force. It created a distinction between the role of the RC as an operational force and strategic reserve. Second, the addition of the Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in 2012 demonstrated recognition for the significance of NG contributions and provided a better platform to voice NG concerns within the DOD. The Chief of the JCS, General Martin Dempsey, voiced disagreement of this move stating there was not a compelling reason for it. In addition, he stated for reasons of representation and accountability, it was not needed.²⁴

The CNGR published a final report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense on January 31, 2008. Titled, *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force*, this report produced six conclusions and ninety-five recommendations that identified changes required to create or maintain an operational RC.²⁵

²⁴ US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Testimony on Whether the Chief National Guard Bureau, Should be a Member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff* (112th Congress, 1st Session, November 10, 2011), accessed February 2, 2016, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg73592/html/CHRG-112shrg73592.htm>.

²⁵ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 1.

Summarized Conclusions from the CNGR Final Report
Conclusion One: The nation requires an operational reserve force.
Conclusion Two: The Department of Defense must be fully prepared to protect American lives and property in the homeland. As part of DoD, the National Guard and Reserves should play the lead role in supporting the Department of Homeland Security, other federal agencies, and states in addressing these threats of equal or higher priority.
Conclusion Three: A new integrated personnel management structure is needed to provide trained and ready forces to meet mission requirements and to foster a continuum of service for the individual service member.
Conclusion Four: A ready, capable, and accessible operational reserve will require an enduring commitment to invest in the readiness of the reserve components.
Conclusion Five: To maintain an operational reserve force over the long term, DoD must appropriately support not only the service members themselves but also the two major influencers of members' decisions to remain in the military—their families and employers.
Conclusion Six: The current reserve component structure does not meet the needs of an operational reserve force.

Figure 1. Summarized Conclusions from the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves Final Report

Source: Author created from source document: Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force* (Arlington, VA: January 31, 2008), 11, 14, 18, 27, 36, 45.

The key take away from the conclusions of the CNGR, summarized in Figure 1, is the need for a change in the structure of the RC to enable it to contribute as an operational force. Overall, the recommendations and findings influenced policy makers and DOD leadership to begin the process of directing the management of the RC in its operational role. The CNGR's recommendations, if fully implemented, represent a significant change to the current operational status and procedures of the RC. The changes would be on par with the significance of the *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*.²⁶ This comparison was made based on the need for increase interoperability and reliance between the AC and RC, touted by the CNGR, had similarities to the requirements created by the *Goldwater-Nichols Act* between the services. An example, listed in Figure 1 under Conclusion Three, is the creation of a continuum of service to better integrate RC and AC service members.

²⁶ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 4.

On October 29, 2008, Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, issued DODD 1200.17 establishing “the overarching set of principles and policies to promote and support the management of the Reserve Components (RCs) as an operational force.”²⁷ He stated that it is DOD policy to integrate the AC and RCs as a Total Force, utilize the continuum of service to enhance and sustain the all-volunteer force, and implement utilization rules to enhance predictability and the prudent use of the RCs. This is similar to the original Total Force concept except that DODD 1200.17 identified that the RC serves in an operational role when the RC mobilizes according to its Services’ force generation plan and serves in a strategic role when the RC is available according to national defense strategy or emergent requirements.²⁸ There is however, still further distinction required to understand the operational and strategic roles of the RC.

In 2009 the GAO found that, “the Army has not established firm readiness requirements for an operational reserve component or fully incorporated the resources needed to support the operational role into its budget and projected spending plan.”²⁹ Going beyond the requirements to adjust training, equipping, and readiness issues, the report further identified a potential misunderstanding of the RC’s operational role. The report stated, “DOD also drew a distinction between managing the reserve components as an operational force and transitioning reserves to an operational force.”³⁰ This confusion is important to note, as there is a significant distinction between managing the RC in an operational role and transitioning the entire force into an

²⁷ US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force,” 1.

²⁸ Ibid., 2.

²⁹ John Pendleton, “GAO-09-898 Army Needs to Finalize an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy for Sustaining an Operational Reserve Force,” 37.

³⁰ Ibid., 39. “In this report, we defined transitioning reserves to an operational force as implementing those steps necessary to adapt the Army’s institutions and resources to support the cyclical readiness requirements and implement the “train-mobilize-deploy” model.”

operational force.

Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 1235.12 originally published on February 4, 2010 and updated April 4, 2012 by Gail H. McGinn, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Plans), further established DOD policy ensuring the RC is able to provide “operational capability and strategic depth in support of the national defense strategy.”³¹ The policy, which can be changed, directed involuntary mobilization is not to exceed one year excluding individual skill training and post mobilization leave. DODI 1235.12 set the RC dwell ratio at one year mobilized to five years in dwell. DODI 1235.12 stated a mobilization order is to be approved 180 days prior to the mobilization date and authorized alert notification up to 24 months prior to mobilization. During emergencies a minimum of 30 days notification prior to involuntary mobilization is expected however, in “crisis situations, some RC forces may be required immediately.”³² The dwell and lead-time required by DODI 1235.12 enables force generation by enabling mobilizing units and soldiers to execute training prior to mobilization, notify employers, prepare family members, and increase unit equipping, manning, and readiness levels.

DODI 1225.06 also published in 2012 focuses on the equipping of the RC. “The RCs must have the right equipment, available in the right quantities, at the right time, and at the right place to support a “Train, Mobilize, and Deploy” construct for the Total Force.”³³ This policy is intended to ensure the unit mobilizing has, or has access to, appropriate equipment to allow for adequate training prior to mobilization. DODI 1225.06 does not state that every RC unit will be

³¹ US Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Plans) Gail H. McGinn, “Accessing the Reserve Components (RC),” Department of Defense Instruction Number 1235.12, Incorporating Change 1 (Washington, DC: April 4, 2012), 2, accessed January 21, 2016, <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/123512p.pdf>.

³² Ibid., 3.

³³ US Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Jo Ann Rooney, “Equipping the Reserve Forces,” Department of Defense Instruction Number 1225.06 (Washington, DC, May 16, 2012), 2, accessed January 21, 2016, <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/122506p.pdf>.

fully equipped but allows for distribution and modernization priorities among RC units by “applying the same methodology as used for AC units having the same mission requirements.”³⁴ The policy provided by DODI 1225.06 allows for cross leveling to take place and emphasizes the need for RC units to have the equipment they will mobilize with during drill and Annual Training periods.

John M. McHugh, the Secretary of the Army, published Army Directive 2012-08 (Army Total Force Policy) on September 4, 2012. The directive established policies for the AC and RC to form an integrated operational force as a part of the “Total Force.”³⁵ The directive requires the departments to organize, train, sustain, equip, and employ the Total Force to support requirements of the combatant commands and to integrate AC and RC forces and capabilities at the tactical level when possible.³⁶

Prior to the publication of the amended version of DODI 1235.12 and Army Directive 2012-08 (Army Total Force Policy), *Joint Forces Quarterly* published two articles in the fourth quarter of 2010 focusing on the RC’s role as an operational force. The first article, “Developing an Operational Reserve: A Policy and Historical Context and the Way Forward,” identified the lack of movement by the Army in establishing funding, training, equipping, and manning policies to maintain the Army National Guard and Reserve in an operational role.³⁷ The author John Winkler highlighted the need to follow up on the conclusions of the CNGR report and identified

³⁴ US Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Jo Ann Rooney, “Equipping the Reserve Forces,” 2.

³⁵ US Secretary of the Army John M. McHugh, “Army Directive 2012-08 (Army Total Force Policy),” Memorandum for See Distribution (Washington, DC: September 04, 2012), 1, accessed January 21, 2016, http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/ad2012_08.pdf.

³⁶ Ibid., 2.

³⁷ John D. Winkler, “Developing an Operational Reserve: A Policy and Historical Context and the Way Forward,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Issue 59, 4th Quarter 2010, 14-20), 15, accessed January 21, 2016, <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-59.pdf>.

gaps in this effort. Winkler's ideas reflected the tone of the 2010 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* published in February which stated, "Preventing and deterring conflict will likely necessitate the continued use of some elements of the Reserve Component—especially those that possess high- demand skill sets—in an operational capacity well into the future."³⁸ The article and the 2010 QDR identify that some, not all, of the RC may be required to serve in an operational role in the future. The second of the articles published in *Joint Forces Quarterly* in 2010, "Operational for What? The Future of the Guard and Reserves," stated, "Current necessity does not equal continued relevance."³⁹ The article identified a lack of specific guidance in DOD policy as to how the RC will be utilized as an operational force. The authors also recommended further study into the specific use of the RC as an operational force.

DODD 1235.10 directs policy that incorporates the holistic changes discussed in the Total Force. First, it states, "The decision to activate RC forces is made only after determining that it is both judicious and prudent to do so."⁴⁰ Second, it intends to ensure predictability is maximized through the utilization of force generation plans and the train, mobilize, and deploy approach. These policies reflect two important requirements that enable proper management of the RC in its operational role, predictability and prudent use.

The biggest driver of RC change was the sixth conclusion of the CNGR, highlighted in Figure 1 on page 10. It found that the structure of the RC did not meet the requirements of an

³⁸ Department of Defense, 2010 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington DC, February 2010), 53, accessed January 21, 2016, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/QDR/QDR_as_of_29JAN10_1600.pdf.

³⁹ John A. Nagl and Travis Sharp, "Operational for What? The Future of the Guard and Reserves," *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Issue 59, 4th Quarter 2010, 21-29), 23, accessed January 21, 2016, <https://www.hSDL.org/?view&did=17011>.

⁴⁰ US Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, "Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve," Department of Defense Directive Number 1235.10, Incorporating Change 1 (Washington, DC, April 21, 2011), 2, accessed January 21, 2016, <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/123510p.pdf>.

operational force. Since that period, the DOD implemented several policies and took various actions to enable the RC to perform in a role as an operational force. The integration of the RC and AC improved over the last decade of persistent conflict leading many to want to sustain the capability through continued use and resourcing.⁴¹ Ultimately it will take additional resourcing and an appropriate mobilization methodology to ensure the RC can maintain a role as an operational force in the future. The Total Force policy created in the 1970s has reached a point that requires additional change. As the CNGR reports, the changes must be of similar significance to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 mandating the integration of the Joint community.⁴² It is yet to be determined if RC role as an operational force will survive sequestration and changes in national security policy.

⁴¹ Reserve Forces Policy Board, *Reserve Component Use, Balance, Cost and Savings: A Response to Questions from the Secretary of Defense*, 11; National Commission on the Future of the Army, 55.

⁴² Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 4.

Findings

“War against a major adversary would require the full mobilization of all instruments of national power and, to do so, the United States sustains a full-spectrum military that includes strong Reserve and National Guard forces. They provide the force depth needed to achieve victory while simultaneously deterring other threats.”

— The National Military Strategy of the United States of America June 2015

The distinction between the ARNG’s role as a strategic reserve and the use of the ARNG as an operational force continues to evolve based on DOD policy and national security objectives. ARNG units assume the role of an operational force upon entering the ARFORGEN cycle at which point they continue to serve in both an operational and strategic role until mobilized. Once mobilized, they become part of the operational force, or, if off ramped, return to a strategic role. This monograph reviewed historical documents based on the hypothesis that changes are required in ARNG training, equipping, readiness, manning, and funding to better enable the management of the ARNG as an operational force. Figure 2 outlines the approach and basic findings.




Figure 2. Findings Map.

Source: Author created with information presented and cited throughout the findings section.

Ambiguity Exists When Defining the Strategic and Operational Role of the Reserve Component

Contemporary policy and literature describe the shift in the RC from a force postured only as a strategic reserve to a force managed as part of the operational force and postured as a strategic reserve. Since September 11, 2001, a significant number of ARNG soldiers mobilized in support of the Global War on Terrorism and other requirements, “representing the largest activation of reservists since the Korean War.”⁴³ The 2016 National Guard posture statement reports “nearly 770,000 individual overseas mobilizations” occurred since September 11, 2001.⁴⁴ During this period, the demand for forces exceeded the supply of ready and available AC forces. AR 525-29 published in March of 2011, defined the period as an era of persistent conflict and stated, “The Army must continue to generate forces in a condition where the global demand for land forces exceeds the available supply.”⁴⁵ The key takeaway is that constant demand influenced the need to distinguish between the roles of the RC. In previous lower demand periods, AC forces filled most force requirements. For most soldiers in the RC mobilization once in a career was the expectation.⁴⁶ During the Cold War, RC forces supported AC forces in the event of a large-scale war, as the follow on force, with the expectation the AC would mobilize first. As a strategic reserve, RC forces required additional training after mobilization (post-mobilization).⁴⁷

As a strategic reserve, units followed the “mobilize-train-deploy” construct to attain the

⁴³ John Pendleton, “GAO-09-898 Army Needs to Finalize an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy for Sustaining an Operational Reserve Force,” 1.

⁴⁴ Frank J. Grass, “2016 National Guard Bureau Posture Statement,” 4, accessed January 21, 2016, <http://www.nationalguard.mil/portals/31/Documents/PostureStatements/2016%20National%20Guard%20Bureau%20Posture%20Statement.pdf>.

⁴⁵ Army Regulation 525-29, *Army Force Generation* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 14, 2011), 1.

⁴⁶ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 41.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 52.

appropriate level of readiness after mobilization.⁴⁸ One of the primary differences between the strategic and operational role is the expectation or predictability of a mobilization. As a strategic reserve, a unit in the ARNG is not assigned a specific mission. “ARNG units in the ARFORGEN cycle are assigned as Contingency Expeditionary Forces (CEFs) or Deployment Expeditionary Forces (DEFs). These designations correspond with their planned employment during the Available year.”⁴⁹ Remaining outside of the ARFORGEN cycle, not receiving a Notice of Sourcing (NOS), limits a unit’s ability to train on specific areas or tasks typically identified by Forces Command (FORSCOM) or a Geographic Combatant Command conducting Training and Readiness Oversight (TRO). A battalion serving in the role of a strategic reserve would not necessarily use statutory training days, drill assemblies and Annual Training, to train for a specific task to be conducted in a specific area of operations in the same way a unit designated as a CEF or DEF would. The “mobilize-train-deploy” construct used in the role of strategic reserve lacks predictability and limits resources. It is why additional training and resourcing are required post-mobilization for the ARNG in a strategic role. Going a step further a unit designated a CEF that does not receive a NOS will not receive the same training resources to enable training as a unit in receipt of a NOS. Thus, even a unit serving in an operational role following ARFORGEN can be restricted in its preparation for mobilization.

There is a lack of clarity used to describe the strategic and operational role of the RC. The Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) identified the lack of a formal definition stating, “A strategic reserve, while not officially defined, is that portion of the force kept at lower levels of

⁴⁸ John Pendleton, “GAO-09-898 Army Needs to Finalize an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy for Sustaining an Operational Reserve Force,” 15.

⁴⁹ National Guard Bureau Implementing the Army Force Generation Model in the Army National Guard, A Formula for Operational Capacity White Paper, 1 August 2011, Version 3, Army National Guard Directorate, G5: SPZ, accessed December 6, 2015, 4, <http://arng.ng.mil/resources/News/Publications/Documents/ARFORGENwhitePaper1aug2011v3g2g.pdf>.

readiness and availability than those forces ready for operational use.”⁵⁰

DODD 1200.17 provided the following definitions of the RC strategic and operational role:

The RCs provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet US defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. In their operational roles, RCs participate in a full range of missions according to their Services’ force generation plans. Units and individuals participate in missions in an established cyclic or periodic manner that provides predictability for the combatant commands, the Services, Service members, their families, and employers. In their strategic roles, RC units and individuals train or are available for missions in accordance with the national defense strategy. As such, the RCs provide strategic depth and are available to transition to operational roles as needed.⁵¹

The National Guard Bureau attempted to reduce the confusion by providing the following definition:

The ARNG defines the term Operational Force as, *All military capabilities (units) regardless of component, within a service’s force generation model that provide operational capacity in support of Combatant Commander requirements*. The term “Operational Reserve” should no longer be used to reference the Reserve Components as part of the Operational Force: it is confusing to apply an operational term in a strategic context: also, the terms are not interchangeable.⁵²

In 2015, the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for Fiscal Year 2016 touted the RC shift from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve proving ambiguity still exists.⁵³ What is clear in this review of RC roles is that the definitions still require more clarity and ARNG units not in the force generation construct will not receive the same level of resourcing as units in the

⁵⁰ Reserve Forces Policy Board, *Reserve Component Use, Balance, Cost and Savings: A Response to Questions from the Secretary of Defense*, 10.

⁵¹ US Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force,” 8.

⁵² National Guard Bureau Implementing the Army Force Generation Model in the Army National Guard, A Formula for Operational Capacity White Paper, 2.

⁵³ Department of Defense, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for Fiscal Year 2016, Washington DC, March, 2015, 2-1. “The year 2015 marks the 42nd anniversary of the Total Force Policy. The Army will continue to seamlessly integrate the Active, Guard, Reserve, and Civilian components. Over the past decade plus, the Army National Guard (ARNG) and United States Army Reserve (USAR) transformed from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve. The Army remains committed to ensuring the Total Force is manned, trained, organized, sustained, equipped, and employed to support combatant command requirements.”

construct, designated as a CEF or DEF and in receipt of a NOS.

As a part of the operational force, the ARNG, in addition to its domestic response mission, is expected to support three different demand spectrums; steady-state, surge, or full surge. “A steady-state rotation occurs when the amount of forces in the Available Force Pool exceeds requirements (supply exceeds demand).” The goal in a steady-state rotation is for the ARNG to mobilize for one year and then enter a dwell period for five years post mobilization. The second spectrum is that of a surge. A surge “occurs when demand exceeds forces in the Available Force Pool.” In a surge, dwell for the ARNG is reduced to four years post mobilization. A surge reduces dwell and increases the readiness requirements for the ARNG executing the ARFORGEN cycle. The final demand spectrum is full surge where more than half of all forces or capabilities are operationally employed. This is the extreme of the demand spectrum and is likely to result in changes to policy and authorities relating to the mobilization and employment of ARNG forces.⁵⁴ A full surge brings all the resources of the military to bear and would likely occur in a national emergency.

When serving in an operational role, the ARNG executes the “train-mobilize-deploy” approach while working through the ARFORGEN process. This approach enables the achievement of a higher level of readiness and training prior to mobilization.⁵⁵ ARNG forces utilize their statutory training resources and conduct additional training events, such as Combat Training Center (CTC) rotations and other validation exercises, in preparation for roles as a CEF or DEF. If training requirements are funded, the operational approach to mobilization enables predictability in the training cycle to a far greater degree than the “mobilize-train-deploy” approach executed as a strategic reserve outside the ARFORGEN cycle.

⁵⁴ Army Regulation 525-29, *Army Force Generation*, 2.

⁵⁵ John Pendleton, “GAO-09-898 Army Needs to Finalize an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy for Sustaining an Operational Reserve Force,” 15.

The Era of Persistent Conflict May End

The military's increased reliance on the RC began in the 1990s during a time of increased military commitments combined with an overall downsizing of the AC. The shift in the use of the RC as an operational force occurred because the demand continued into the 21st Century as RC forces mobilized in support of US efforts to combat terrorism, fight two wars, and conduct numerous contingency operations at home and abroad. In this capacity, the RC served as an emergency force (strategic reserve) and a rotational force (operational force). The immediate call up of reservists to support Operation Noble Eagle several days after September 11, 2001, and the mobilization and deployment of ARNG Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) to both OEF and OIF using the ARFORGEN process are examples respectively. This increase in demand influenced military and civilian leaders to relook how the RC operated and integrated in the Total Force.

First, the demand for forces outweighed the supply and the desire to reduce AC tour lengths required additional use of the RC. Second, RC forces and their supporters did not want to give up the additional resources, training opportunities (CTC rotations, OCONUS exercises, etc) afforded to the RC performing as a part of the operational force. The RC gained experience and increased readiness levels with its continued use; supporters and leaders in the RC did not want to see these gains disappear.⁵⁶ Given the operational tempo of the US military in the first decade of the 21st century there was legitimacy in the continued use of the RC in an operational role. However, in 2009 author John Nagl asked the question, "operational for what?"⁵⁷ He understood the concept of an operational force but presented the case that a better description of the requirement or role would explain why the RC should be employed as an operational force. In 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta asked the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) a

⁵⁶ Reserve Forces Policy Board, *Reserve Component Use, Balance, Cost and Savings: A Response to Questions from the Secretary of Defense*, 11.

⁵⁷ John A. Nagl and Travis Sharp, "Operational for What? The Future of the Guard and Reserves," 21-29.

similar set of questions. He focused on, “The best ways to use the Reserve Components in support of the Defense Strategic Guidance; the right balance or mix of Active and Reserve Component forces; the cost to maintain a Strong Reserve; and how the Department can achieve cost savings in relation to the Reserve Components.”⁵⁸

Despite policy mandating the management of the RC as a part of the operational force the conversation continues as to the roles of the RC. As a strategic reserve, the RC reduces national military risk by providing capable and accessible force structure, at a reduced cost when not in use, for the conduct of large combat operations, stability operations, or other requirements as directed.⁵⁹ The RC houses additional capabilities, beyond what the AC has, that can be ready in months not years. The RC is a means to expand the operational reach of the AC. Prior to the All-Volunteer Force and the Total Force concept conscription filled the ranks during extended operations such as the Vietnam War. Today the RC fills the role.

The RC provides depth but the continued reliance on the RC in an operational role is still in question:

In the operational role, the Reserve Components should continue to provide forces to help meet both steady state peacetime engagement and contingency requirements of the Combatant Commanders; both at home and abroad. The Reserve Components should be employed operationally as an integral component of our National Defense Strategy, although at a level below their use over the past decade.⁶⁰

The shift required at the start of the 21st century and during an era of persistent conflict may not be required if the demand for US military forces is reduced. The assumption that the US military is operating in an era of persistent conflict and will continue to engage at similar levels of effort needs to be analyzed.

⁵⁸ Reserve Forces Policy Board, *Reserve Component Use, Balance, Cost and Savings: A Response to Questions from the Secretary of Defense*, 4.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

The RC: Expensive to Use, Cheap to Maintain

RC mobilizations increased significantly over the past 20 years. The RFPB reported the use of the RC grew from an average of 3,000 man-years supporting operational missions in the five years prior to 1991, to 35,000 man-years on average in the six years prior to 2001. For the nine years following 2001, the average grew to 146,000 man-years across all services.⁶¹ The increase in RC mobilizations does not necessarily mean future RC requirements will increase or even remain the same.

A RAND study titled *Assessing the Army's Active-Reserve Component Force Mix*, used cost analysis and output as an approach to review force structure requirements in the AC and RC. The study compared RC and AC forces and the costs associated when each is mobilized and how much each could be mobilized to achieve a specific output. The study did not address the effectiveness of RC vs AC units and assumed AC and RC effectiveness after mobilization to be the same. The study focused on two outputs: “the time needed for units to become ready to deploy abroad in a crisis and how frequently units are available to deploy over time.”⁶² The resulting analysis demonstrated that AC forces are cheaper to use and maintain than RC forces in

⁶¹ Reserve Forces Policy Board, *Reserve Component Use, Balance, Cost and Savings: A Response to Questions from the Secretary of Defense*, 9.

⁶² Joshua Klimas and RAND Corporation, *Assessing the Army's Active-Reserve Component Force Mix*, 4, accessed January 21, 2016, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR417-1/RAND_RR417-1.pdf. “There are a number of ways to think about the output that AC and RC forces provide for their respective costs. One way is to assume that AC and RC units are identical in terms of output—that is, to assume that a RC unit of a given type is interchangeable with an AC unit of the same type, with no difference in areas such as the time needed to become ready to deploy in a crisis, the frequency of deployment for sustained missions, or mission effectiveness. This way of thinking assumes that the key difference between AC and RC units is in their operating cost (e.g., pay, training, support), which is lower, on average, for RC units. We found that simple one-to-one unit cost comparisons of AC and RC units are fundamentally flawed in that they fail to account for differences in the output that AC and RC units provide. The outputs we focus on in this report include (1) the time needed for units to become ready to deploy abroad in a crisis and (2) how frequently units are available to deploy over time. Again, we do not address potential differences in effectiveness between AC and RC units.”

this output-based model. This finding is based on the assumptions or constants: output will continue because of an era of persistent conflict, dwell policies remain the same, and force structure is built to achieve output. The study found that when using the two-to-one dwell for the AC and a five-to-one dwell ratio for the RC, it takes 2.7 RC units to achieve the same output as an AC unit.⁶³ The additional force structure required to maintain a unit mobilization, given the current dwell policies, is the biggest factor why the study found the RC to cost more. The study did recognize the cost savings of the RC is designed around its reduced use in a strategic role not on building additional RC force structure to match the operational output of the AC. The study demonstrates the cost savings of the RC with a simple one-to-one comparison where RC units are 50 to 60 percent cheaper than AC units.⁶⁴ The GAO summarizes this fact stating:

As a strategic reserve, the reserve components were not maintained to be immediately ready for deployment, and it was expected that they would receive additional equipment, personnel, and training after they were mobilized. However, as an operational force, reserve units need to build and maintain readiness prior to mobilization to support recurring deployments.⁶⁵

The NCFA addresses the cost of use by recommending the Army budget for and Congress authorize no fewer than 3,000 man-years annually for the use of Army RCs supporting contingency operations. It should be noted the recommended use of 3,000 man-years drops back to the levels of RC use prior to 1991.⁶⁶ While OCO and other supplements may make up for additional use they are not guaranteed and thus do not promote predictability. Overall, what the

⁶³ Joshua Klimas and RAND Corporation, *Assessing the Army's Active-Reserve Component Force Mix*, 11.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 9.

⁶⁵ John Pendleton, “GAO-09-898 Army Needs to Finalize an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy for Sustaining an Operational Reserve Force,” 2.

⁶⁶ National Commission on the Future of the Army, 66. “Recommendation 30: The Army should budget for and the Congress should authorize and fund no fewer than 3,000 man years annually for 12304b utilization of the reserve components. The Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Army and the Office of Management and Budget, should also provide for the use of Overseas Contingency Operations and supplemental funding for reserve component utilization under 12304b.”

RAND study and GAO highlight is the RC is a more cost effective option when not in use and a more costly option when in use given specific criteria such as the current dwell policy.

“Mobilize-Train-Deploy” verse “Train-Mobilize-Deploy”

The difference in how the RC trains to deploy in a strategic role verse an operational role is in the “mobilize-train-deploy” construct versus a “train-mobilize-deploy” construct. Training prior to mobilization reduces the need for training post-mobilization. This increased readiness allows for more time available to the Geographic Combatant Commander based on the current dwell policy, which only allows for a one-year mobilization. Mobilization time includes post mobilization training and demobilization thus reducing the actual deployment time.




Figure 3. Mobilization Timeline.

Source: Author created from source document: National Guard Bureau Implementing the Army Force Generation Model in the Army National Guard, A Formula for Operational Capacity White Paper, 1 August 2011, Version 3, Army National Guard Directorate, G5: SPZ, 6.

Additionally, the inclusion in the ARFORGEN cycle provides predictability in the training cycle and authorizes, if available, additional training resources. There is still training required post-mobilization regardless of the inclusion in ARFORGEN. The National Guard Bureau stated Brigade Combat Teams require 30-45 days of post mobilization training to achieve a T1 status

prior to deployment.⁶⁷ In addition, the 19 days of additional Active Duty Training (ADT) allowed per the Draft Army National Guard, Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Execution Guidance are historically conducted four months prior to the deployment.⁶⁸ This matters more for the Army and the status the soldiers are in than it does for families and employers who are simply without their significant other or employee for a period greater than a year. The dwell concept only accounts for time in a Title 10 mobilized status. It does not account for time at home, informally called “head-on-pillow” time by AC soldiers with high operational tempos such as those serving in US Special Operations Command.⁶⁹ This means a soldier while technically only mobilized for 365 days is actually gone for a longer period because of other training requirements prior to mobilization.

ARFORGEN and the “train-mobilize-deploy” construct enable a unit to focus training on the “geographically oriented, mission-specific tasks” encounter as a CEF or DEF.⁷⁰ Units in ARFORGEN take a more focused approach to training than a unit outside of ARFORGEN. Predictability and anticipated mission focus provided by inclusion in ARFORGEN enable better use of statutory training resources. Ellen Pint, author of *Active Component Responsibility in Reserve Component Pre- and Postmobilization Training*, defines Premobilization training time as, “the average of inactive duty training plus Annual Training days for soldiers who deployed

⁶⁷ National Guard Bureau Implementing the Army Force Generation Model in the Army National Guard, A Formula for Operational Capacity White Paper, 6.

⁶⁸ Army National Guard, Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Execution Guidance, Version 1, October 01, 2015, 146.

⁶⁹ Janice Burton, ed, “Q&A Admiral William H. McRaven, Commander, US Special Operations Command,” *Special Warfare* (Volume 25, issue 2. April-June 2012, 10-11), 10, accessed December 17, 2015. <http://www.soc.mil/swcs/SWmag/archive/SW2502/SW2502QAAdmiralWilliamMcRaven.html>. “We are striving to increase predictability through the various levels of our organizations by mandating minimum “head-on-pillow” time for our force. Predictability is a key element of long-term performance and resiliency. Secondly, we will engender a leadership culture that views PERSTEMPO as an important element of operational readiness.”

⁷⁰ John Pendleton, “GAO-09-898 Army Needs to Finalize an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy for Sustaining an Operational Reserve Force,” 4.

with the unit.”⁷¹ In one year, a unit’s statutory training equals approximately 39 training days (48 Unit Training Assemblies (UTA) = 24 days, 24 days +15 Annual Training (AT) days = 39 days). Without the inclusions of additional training days, this is the number of training days a RC unit can expect to use to accomplish premobilization training in a given year. Pint states, “RC units typically required 45 to 50 training days just to meet individual preparation and training requirements for deployment.”⁷² Pint highlights that additional training days are often required to achieve complete premobilization training. The GAO noted if premobilization training days were limited, the resultant low readiness posture could hinder the effectiveness of premobilization training.⁷³

The other option is to conduct postmobilization training. Postmobilization training is conducted “between mobilization and arrival in theater, which includes time spent at home station; movement to the mobilization station; reception, staging, onward movement, and integration; training days; leave; load-out; and deployment.”⁷⁴ The advantage with post-mobilization training is the unit will be on active duty in a Title 10 status, which reduces the concern for changing of positions, or late fills. It also reduces the strain on employers, as the time away from work is continual, enabling a definitive transition point. The main disadvantage is additional time needed to accomplish training tasks in a mobilized status reduces the time available to the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) given the current policy limits on the

⁷¹ Ellen M. Pint, *Active Component Responsibility in Reserve Component Pre- and Postmobilization Training* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015), 49, accessed January 21, 2016, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR700/RR738/RAND_RR738.pdf.

⁷² Ibid., 72.

⁷³ Ibid., xiv. “The same problems observed in the roundout brigades in 1990 and 1991 persisted in RC units preparing to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan, although some were less severe. These problems included a limited number of premobilization training days; limited access to training ranges, maneuver areas, and some types of equipment; and personnel turnover and annual training attendance issues that limited the effectiveness of premobilization training.”

⁷⁴ Ibid., 49.

mobilization period allowed for the RC. A more holistic approach to mobilization is still required. A piece meal approach only hurts family and employer relations and forces the ARNG to bear the risks involved in premobilization training. “Employers are experiencing many challenges because of the high operational tempo of the reserve components during the past several years. These challenges have caused a strain in relations between employers and DOD.”⁷⁵ Providing a clear line in the sand for a transition point better enables all aspects of training and overall readiness while supporting families and employers. The NCFA reported soldiers, Army RC leaders, and employers support additional use of the RC, however it does not recommend a change in dwell but recommends more flexibility in mobilization.⁷⁶ Willingness to deploy does not mean it is always in the best interest of the soldiers, employers, or families and a more long-term review on the effects to soldiers’ civilian careers and on employers during and post mobilization is required.

ARNG Equipping Success

“Resources remain the principal reason the ARNG is an operational force, and will determine whether it stays that way.”

— Department of Defense. *National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for Fiscal Year 2015.*

The final report published by the CNGR in 2008 reported the National Guard required a

⁷⁵ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 41.

⁷⁶ National Commission on the Future of the Army, 67. “Notably, the Commission heard no declarations among soldiers and leaders in Army National Guard or Army Reserve units that they were being overused. Indeed, the Commission heard more often from reserve component soldiers that they were not being used enough. Army National Guard and Army Reserve members repeatedly told the Commission that they could meet a 1:4 mobilization to dwell ratio; employers likewise endorsed such a ratio for their Army National Guard members and Army Reserve employees. Governors echoed the sentiment, promoting greater use of their Guard forces in federal missions. The only request from all three parties—the soldiers, the employers, and the states—was predictability of deployments whenever possible. The Commission does not recommend a change in the mobilization-to-dwell policy goals but advocates for greater flexibility to allow the Army more efficient use of its forces across all components without incurring undue risk to the force.”

significant increase in equipment fielding to bring it on par with the AC. The AC also had deficiencies in equipping levels during the same period. The report found “The Army does not plan to fully equip the Army Reserve and Army National Guard to the identified requirements until 2019 at the earliest.”⁷⁷ The concerns over the delay and potential for changes in budget requirements over this long period are highlighted as reasons to expedite the process, which appears to be going well. As of March 2014, the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report (NGRER) for Fiscal Year 2015 reported, “The RC equipment levels are at some of the highest levels in history.”⁷⁸ Between 2008 and 2015, the Army made significant improvements equipping the RC.⁷⁹ Despite the success, the NGRER emphasized, “Unless the RC continues to be considered an indispensable part of the Total Force and resourced appropriately, equipment levels are likely to wane with potentially dire consequences.”⁸⁰ Equipping of the ARNG is an area of significant improvement since the publication of the CNGR in 2008. These gains are necessary to allow the continued support of operational activities by ARNG units without a need to cross-level or acquire equipment not on hand when entering the ARFORGEN cycle.⁸¹

⁷⁷ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 227.

⁷⁸ Department of Defense, *National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for Fiscal Year 2015* (Washington, DC: March, 2014), Foreword, accessed January 21, 2016, <http://www.ngaus.org/sites/default/files/FY15NGRER.pdf>.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 2-4. “In conjunction with ARFORGEN and the future force generation model, and in compliance with DoD 1200.17 and DoDI 1225.06, the Army continues to comparably equip the AC and RCs to meet mission requirements. The Army equips all forces based on their priority within the Dynamic Army Resourcing Priorities List (DARPL). In addition, it ensures the RCs always have at least 80 percent of their Critical Dual Use (CDU) items. These are MTOE-authorized items determined critical to the support of Homeland Defense (HD) and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) missions. This allows units to meet their HD and DCSA requirements when not deployed.”

⁸⁰ Ibid., Foreword.

⁸¹ Ibid., 2-9. “Congress’s continued support of Army procurement and the Army’s continued utilization of the ARNG as an operational force have resulted in significant improvements to the ARNG equipment posture and increased equipment on-hand (EOH), Critical Dual Use (CDU) equipment, and the overall modernization levels. ARNG EOH was at 77 percent just four years ago. Today, the ARNG is at 91 percent. Overall, the current CDU EOH is 92

ARNG Maintenance Shortfalls

Significant modernization and investment is required in ARNG maintenance activities. While equipment on hand increased over time, maintenance facilities and resourcing have not kept pace: “Many ARNG shop facilities are more than 50 years old and are neither designed nor equipped to provide a safe, environmentally-friendly workplace, capable of meeting the demands of the Army’s two-level maintenance doctrine to support and maintain a modern and complex, up-armored vehicle fleet.”⁸² The ARNG Installation Division Planning Resource for Infrastructure Development and Evaluation database estimates a need for \$2.24B to modernize surface equipment maintenance facilities.⁸³ The NGRER stated, “Field-level maintenance is critical to ARNG equipment readiness in the ARFORGEN model and for HD, DSCA, and emergency operation missions. It is essential that the ARNG has modern maintenance shop facilities meeting current construction criteria to effectively repair, service, and maintain our operational force’s equipment.”⁸⁴ The NGRER 2015 reports further concern for the ARNG Surface Depot Maintenance Program. Currently funded at “59.2 percent of the ARNG critical

percent, an increase from 65 percent at the time of the Hurricane Katrina response in 2005. Additionally, efforts by Congress to modernize the total Army has resulted in dramatic increases to modernized EOH in the ARNG. Tactical Wheeled Vehicles (TWVs) and armored vehicles in particular have seen the most striking increases, with 48.2 percent of the TWV fleet and 47.1 percent of the armored vehicle fleet considered modern in 2001 compared to 82 percent and 99.8 percent modern (respectively) in 2013. In June 2013, adjustments made to the modernization “cut” levels of several equipment items resulted in the ARNG’s overall EOH modernization percentage increasing from 70 to 85 percent in the current report.” “Cross level in ARFORGEN cycle, reduction in the number of equipment items cross-leveled for mobilization from 2,917 in 2012 to 387 in 2013.”⁸¹ This indicates units are appropriately equipped and do not need to pass off equipment to deploying units leaving home station units without the equipment to train on.

⁸² Department of Defense, *National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for Fiscal Year 2015*, 2-14.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

requirement of \$394M in FY 2014.”⁸⁵ Failure to adequately fund this program will reduce the service life of the fleet, reduce the capacity to sustain equipment on hand, and increase operational tempo spending to make up for the deficiencies.⁸⁶ The Army must continue to equip the RC at its current levels to sustain operational capabilities; it must also invest in maintenance activities to ensure the investment in equipment endures over the long term.⁸⁷

ARNG Manning Practices Still Reflect a Strategic Reserve Posture

“Military full-time support for the Army National Guard should be a mix of active component soldiers and AGR soldiers. Active component soldiers serving in Guard FTS positions should have recent operational experience and serve in rotational assignments of defined duration, under the control of the governor, and be dual-hatted, serving in Title 10 status and in the state’s National Guard.”

— Commission on the National Guard and Reserve. *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force.*

There are two issues related to ARNG personnel management, appropriate notification allowing for personnel moves to round out mobilizing units and reduced fulltime manning. As a review, the fulltime force consists of Active Guard Reserve (AGR) members and technicians. The part-time or traditional force makes up the majority of the ARNG. “84 percent of the [RC]

⁸⁵ Department of Defense, *National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for Fiscal Year 2015*, 2-14.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Department of Defense, *National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for Fiscal Year 2016* (Washington, DC: March, 2015), Foreword, accessed January 21, 2016, <http://www.people.mil/Portals/56/Documents/mf/NGRER%20FY2016.pdf>. “As the Department manages the impacts of the Budget Control Act, individual Services continue to make difficult resource choices, potentially at significant cost to the RC. Historically, practices such as RC underfunding, cascading of outdated equipment from the Active Component (AC) to RC, and labeling of obsolete equipment as “modern” have been considered reasonable for a “Strategic Reserve”. This era is over. To fully respond to the worldwide demand for RC capabilities, to ensure component interoperability, and to keep faith with the expectations and experiences of all who serve, deliberate and sustained modernization and procurement funding must be recognized as an institutional imperative.”

personnel serve in a traditional part-time status. The remaining personnel are either Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) or Technicians.”⁸⁸ The part-time force reports for weekend drill, Annual Training, or other specified duty requirements. The fulltime force maintains the readiness of ARNG units including periods outside of unit assemblies and mobilization periods.

Personnel manning influences other readiness functions and is the backbone of ARNG unit readiness. Ensuring the appropriate mix of full time support and filling unit vacancies is required to ensure adequate preparation for mobilization. The GAO reported, “Although officials report that the Army reserve component units are meeting the Army’s required levels of ready personnel by the time that they deploy, the reserve component units continue to have difficulty in achieving goals for personnel readiness and unit stability prior to mobilization.”⁸⁹

Sometimes the RC is not able to fill the unit vacancies ahead of time. One potential cause is delay in notification. The CNGR stated First Army reported mobilization orders did not get to individual reservists “until 30 to 40 days prior to mobilization.”⁹⁰ DOD authorizes notification two years prior to the mobilization date. Delays in notification do not facilitate management of the training schedule or allow appropriate personnel actions to better enable readiness management. Ensuring predictability in the mobilization process allows units to fill vacancies and build the force package for the mobilization. “The Army’s goal is to have an affordable and versatile mix of “tailorable” and networked units operating on a rotational cycle and capable of full spectrum operations.”⁹¹ Early notification ensures all resources can be allocated to provide

⁸⁸ Department of Defense, *National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for Fiscal Year 2015*, 2-10.

⁸⁹ John Pendleton, “GAO-09-898 Army Needs to Finalize an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy for Sustaining an Operational Reserve Force,” 24. “As a result, the Army has had to continue to take steps to build readiness after mobilization.”

⁹⁰ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 241.

⁹¹ Department of Defense, *National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for Fiscal Year 2016*, 2-5.

collective training during the pre-mobilization training period. Author John Pendleton of the GAO pointed out, “Early assignment of personnel and stabilization of deploying units is necessary to make efficient use of training time and build a cohesive force so that the units can efficiently achieve required levels of collective training proficiency and provide as much operational availability as possible to theater commanders.”⁹²

The second issue with ARNG personnel readiness is the reduced numbers of the fulltime staff. Reduced fulltime staff limits the effectiveness and responsiveness as an operational force. The GAO reported in 2009 that, “The Army’s reserve components are not authorized the number of full-time personnel needed to meet the requirements established for their strategic role, and requirements for the operational role have not been determined.”⁹³ In 2015 RAND followed with a report stating:

It is important to maintain unified, multicomponent training support organizations, to be consistent with Total Force Policy, to ensure that training standards do not diverge across components in the future, and to conserve resources in a time of declining budgets. However, First Army may need to make greater use of USAR training support personnel during their annual training periods to support premobilization collective training events, and the ARNG could increase its involvement by filling its authorized positions in First Army.⁹⁴

Author Ellen Pint’s recommendation for the ARNG is valid but there are two sides to the argument. First, across the nation the ARNG continues to be undermanned in FTUS positions. The counter argument is the ARNG is not undermanned but has distributed its manning to the

⁹² John Pendleton, “GAO-09-898 Army Needs to Finalize an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy for Sustaining an Operational Reserve Force,” 25.

⁹³ Ibid., 19. “For fiscal year 2010, the Army National Guard and Army Reserve required about 119,000 full-time support positions but were only authorized 87,000 positions, or about 73 percent of the requirement. The current full-time support requirement is based on a manpower study conducted in 1999 when the reserve components were still primarily a strategic reserve.”

⁹⁴ Ellen M. Pint, *Active Component Responsibility in Reserve Component Pre- and Postmobilization Training*, xv.

wrong places.⁹⁵ The issue is not only with the First Army positions but positions across the ARNG. Obviously if the ARNG is undermanned and those FTUS positions are incorrectly distributed the problem is only exacerbated.

Budgeting for ARNG Contributions to the Operational Force

With increased use comes increased cost. In 2009, the GAO estimated the costs could be \$12-27 billion to transition the entire RC to an operational force over a period spanning 2010-2015, but stated “costs could vary widely from the initial estimates.”⁹⁶ The Army had not identified essential costs or resourcing levels required to manage the RC in an operational role. Additionally, costs beyond the ARFORGEN cycle had not been calculated. These costs included incentives and retirement expenses associated with potential changes in the “continuum of service initiatives.”⁹⁷ Thus far, ARNG equipping and maintenance requirements have already been discussed. This section will focus on the training costs required to manage an operational ARNG.

Currently Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funds, during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, helped fund ARNG training and readiness requirements during the last two years prior to a unit’s mobilization date when using the “train-mobilize-deploy” approach. OCO funds “are meant to fund the incremental, temporary costs of overseas conflicts in Afghanistan,

⁹⁵ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 85. “The Army’s reserve components are critically short of FTS personnel—mainly provided by the Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) program—at the small unit level. While evidence of the shortage there is strong, one group of researchers has suggested that the fundamental problem is not numbers but the distribution of current full-time support personnel in the Army’s reserve components, which it contends is not optimal to maintain unit readiness. Analysts at RAND have argued that many FTS personnel are assigned to non-deployable billets, “estimating that less than one-quarter of the total 66,000 full-time support staff in 2000 was assigned at the company level or below.” The shortage of FTS staff has created enormous readiness challenges for these components.”

⁹⁶ John Pendleton, “GAO-09-898 Army Needs to Finalize an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy for Sustaining an Operational Reserve Force,” 32.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 31.

Iraq and elsewhere.”⁹⁸ Currently, OCO funds are only authorized for use when ARNG soldiers are listed on the NOS List or the soldiers have alert orders for the mobilization. For FY16 OCO funds are authorized for ARNG soldiers supporting, “OEF in the CENTCOM AOR (Kuwait, Qatar, Afghanistan, and Iraq), Horn of Africa and Guantanamo Bay [and] \$17M was identified within OCO military pay funding to support State Partnership/European Assurance initiatives.”⁹⁹ The importance of OCO funding is the additional training time and readiness activities the funding supports.

⁹⁸ Cheryl Pellerin, “Carter Urges Senators to Support Stable Defense Budget,” DoD News, Defense Media Activity, accessed January 28, 2016, <http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/604586>.

⁹⁹ Army National Guard, Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Execution Guidance, 23.

Out Years		M-2 13-24 months prior to mobilization date		M-1 1-12 months prior to mobilization date		Mobilization Date
Statutory Annual Training	15 Days	Statutory Annual Training	15 Days	Statutory Annual Training	15 Days	
Statutory Drill	24 Days	Statutory Drill	24 Days	Statutory Drill	24 Days	
		Additional Unit Training Assembly	7 Days If OCO funds are available	Additional Unit Training Assembly	7 Days Priority for OCO funding	
		Additional Annual Training	6 Days If OCO funds are available	Additional Annual Training	6 Days Priority for OCO funding	
		Pre-Mobilization Schools	Schools for cross-leveled soldiers or deployment requirements	Not provided in M-1 so units focus on collective training		
Training Days per Soldier	39 Days	Training Days per Soldier	54 Days	Training Days per Soldier	73 Days	
"Units eligible OCO funding must meet the following criteria: 1. Must have a Notification of Sourcing (NOS) or Alert Order 2. Must be within 24 months of projected mobilization date (M-1 or M-2)" (ARNG, FY 16 Budget Execution Guidance, 142.)						

Figure 4. Overseas Contingency Operations Support Prior to Mobilization

Source: Author created from source document: Army National Guard, Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Execution Guidance, Version 1, October 01, 2015.

Beyond the additional training days highlighted in Figure 4, OCO supports additional fulltime manpower requirements, medical readiness and soldier medical support, additional trainers, maintenance man-days, and demobilization support in the form of the yellow ribbon program. "A unit within two years of the Available Year in the ARFORGEN cycle, but not in receipt of NOS, is NOT considered for additional OCO funding for mobilizations."¹⁰⁰ This highlights the need to identify units for mobilization early to ensure they receive the appropriate funding. Per the ARNG, the goal is for units to receive a NOS two years before the unit mobilizes, an Alert Order one year before the unit mobilizes, and a Mobilization Order six months before the unit

¹⁰⁰ Army National Guard, Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Execution Guidance, 140.

mobilizes. “Units begin “earnings” on the month the unit first appears on the NOS or the M-1/M-2 year marks, which ever is later.”¹⁰¹ The timeliness of the NOS and subsequent funding enables ARNG units to maximize resources prior to mobilization and continues to be an area needing improvement.¹⁰² Currently the additional training is conducted when OCO is available. The true test will be to see if the same training methodology and availability of funding survives reduced OCO funding and a move to funding through the base Army budget.

Mobilizing the ARNG, Hard to Access or Hard to Predict?

“We are conducting resource-informed planning.” “And we are using tailored forces that deploy for limited timeframes to execute specific missions, recognizing that “campaign persistence” is necessary against determined adversaries.”

— The National Military Strategy of the United States of America June 2015.

The mobilization process is an area of concern for both the AC and the RC. AC and RC leaders cite difficulty in understanding the accessibility of the RC.¹⁰³ RC members cite difficulties

¹⁰¹ Army National Guard, Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Execution Guidance, 142.

¹⁰² John Pendleton, “GAO-09-898 Army Needs to Finalize an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy for Sustaining an Operational Reserve Force,” 17. “The Army has established a goal of issuing alert orders to reserve component units at least 12 months prior to their mobilization in order to provide them enough time to attain required levels of ready personnel for deployment. Army data show that the Army has increased the amount of notice it provides to mobilizing Army National Guard units from an average of 113 days in 2005 to 236 in 2008.”

¹⁰³ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 160. Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Use, Balance, Cost and Savings: A Response to Questions from the Secretary of Defense, Final Report to the Secretary of Defense (RFPB Report FY14-02), February 11, 2014, 10, accessed January 21, 2016, <http://www.ncfa.ncr.gov/sites/default/files/RFPB%20Reserve%20Component%20Use%2C%20Balance%2C%20Cost%20and%20Savings%20Final%20Signed%20Report%20without%20Slides.pdf>. “GEN Fogleman stated that one needs to personally understand what it takes to be a Guardsman and Reservist, and that Service Chiefs need to believe in the necessary changes, know the facts about accessibility of the Guard and Reserve, and be prepared to stand up to commanders in the Active Component.”

in notification and concerns for voluntary versus involuntary mobilizations.¹⁰⁴ Additionally, ARNG OCO funding is limited to missions executed under Title 10 USC 12302. This means ARNG units conducting missions under Title 10 12304b authorities are funded from the base Army budget for training conducted in the “train-mobilize-deploy” construct. “These missions include (but not limited to) MFO (Sinai), Operation Joint Guardian, KFOR, Balkans, OEF Caribbean Central Area, Joint Task Force Bravo and Operation Noble Eagle.”¹⁰⁵ Without early budgetary planning to get the required additional training costs into the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and without early notification, units are not able to maximize pre-mobilization training opportunities and thus will likely require post-mobilization training. Without resource informed planning, the ARNG may be forced to return to the mobilization model of the strategic reserve. The NCFA recommends a return to predictable budgeting but it will take action by the Army and Congress to make the recommendations a reality.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁴ Matthew R. Bray, “The Operational Role of Army National Guard Special Forces: Optimizing an Underutilized Asset,” Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, CA: December, 2013), 35. “In most instances, the remaining 25 percent of personnel do not volunteer for these missions because of the impact voluntary activations have on civilian employment.”

¹⁰⁵ Army National Guard, Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Execution Guidance, 135.

¹⁰⁶ National Commission on the Future of the Army, 44. “Recommendation 6: The Congress and the Administration should return to predictable and responsible budgeting processes that meet minimum funding requirements.” Page 40 includes further dialogue on OCO and the need for a long-term funding approach. “Despite the use of OCO funding, no satisfactory long-term funding approach provides DOD and the Army the funds needed to build and maintain military readiness, invest in modernization, and ensure the health of the force. In this constrained budget environment, the Army prioritized manpower numbers and force readiness to hedge against near-term demands, accepting substantial risk in modernization. The Commission finds this solution regrettable but understandable, given the persistence of challenges to the United States and the ongoing strain those challenges are putting on ground forces, especially Regular Army combat formations and Army National Guard and Army Reserve enablers.”

Conclusion

“First, it helps maintain the experience, skills, and readiness gained through twelve years of war for the hundreds of thousands of National Guard and Reserve personnel who have been mobilized. Second, it frees up Active Component forces to ensure their availability to respond immediately to no-notice contingency warfighting requirements. Third, it reduces Active Component deployment tempo and aids in the preservation of the All-Volunteer Force.”¹⁰⁷

— Reserve Forces Policy Board, *Reserve Component Use, Balance, Cost and Savings: A Response to Questions from the Secretary of Defense*

In December 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated “You go to war with the Army you have—not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time.”¹⁰⁸ Rumsfeld offered this famous response to soldiers serving in Iraq who voiced concerns about being improperly equipped for the tasks they faced. His response, while not directed at the RC specifically, reflected the posture of a strategic reserve readiness model. Essentially forces mobilized out of a strategic reserve readiness model may not have the highest level of training, equipping, or resourcing reserved for top tier units. In the period that followed the attacks on September 11, 2001, military and civilian leaders understood this posture needed to change, as both OEF and OIF required recurring mobilizations of both AC and RC units. The ARNG in particular felt the strain of a force manned, trained, equipped, and funded as a strategic reserve.¹⁰⁹ In 2005, Congress established the CNGR to identify the changes required to solve readiness and

¹⁰⁷ Reserve Forces Policy Board, *Reserve Component Use, Balance, Cost and Savings: A Response to Questions from the Secretary of Defense*, 11.

¹⁰⁸ Donald Rumsfeld, *Known and Unknown: A Memoir* (New York, NY: Penguin Group US, 2011), 645.

¹⁰⁹ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 55. “The notion of an operational reserve occurred almost by default, in response to current and projected needs for forces greater than were available from the active component. DOD has taken several years to define an operational reserve, and the definition it has drafted offers little guidance to policymakers. Because the nation backed into this major decision, the needs of the reserve forces were not considered; nor were consequences of the change—such as the impact on reserve readiness, and the strain on individual reservists as well as their families and employers—taken into account.”

capability gaps in the RC. The CNGR identified the RC structure as a problem. At the time, RC structure did not support the continued use of the RC in the operational role after what the report called an “unplanned evolution to an operational reserve.”¹¹⁰ In 2008, following the publication of the final report by the CNGR, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates established DOD policy to manage the RC as an operational force. While many changes took place to facilitate the implementation of this policy, there are still more changes required enabling the ARNG to operate as an operational force and ways to better manage the process. These changes include a review of the mobilization process ensuring adequate preparation while reducing the risk on individual soldiers and employers, continued equipping of the ARNG in line with the AC, servicing aging ARNG maintenance facilities and funding maintenance programs, increasing and appropriately distributing fulltime manning in the ARNG, and providing predictable deployments and budgets to support operational requirements. Predictability is the theme for the continued use of the ARNG in an operational role. Joshua Klimas articulated this very point when he stated, “Because RC units generally need additional training and preparation time after mobilization but before they deploy, the amount of warning the United States can expect before deploying forces is an important factor in decisions about the active and reserve force mix.”¹¹¹

A review of the ARNG mobilization process should be conducted to determine the most effective and efficient way to train ARNG units prior to and during mobilization. This review must take into account the needs of families and employers. The current 365-day dwell limitation does not account for the additional time required for a mobilization placing the risks, missed civilian employment and time away from family, upon the soldiers. Increasing training opportunities and readiness by increasing resourcing levels should continue but must be

¹¹⁰ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2.

¹¹¹ Joshua Klimas and RAND Corporation, *Assessing the Army's Active-Reserve Component Force Mix*, 4.

considered in a holistic view. As it stands a ARNG soldier expects to miss four weeks of civilian employment two years prior to a mobilization and seven weeks of civilian employment one year prior to a mobilization, followed by approximately 13 months of absence for deployment and leave. Only the most lenient employers can or are willing to assume this loss. It should also be noted this does not include additional schooling such as military occupational specialty training or professional military education which only add to the time of absence from civilian employment.

Supply is an area where investment improved ARNG readiness moving it in line with the AC. While the status is an improvement, ARNG equipping must continue, through future investment and new equipment fielding, to be managed in a comparable manner to the AC.¹¹² Equipment must be available on a regular basis for training. This does not require equipping the entire force but rather ensuring a plan that allows all ARNG forces, not just those entering the ARFORGEN cycle, to achieve unit specific equipping readiness levels and access to required theater specific equipment during statutory training periods.¹¹³

¹¹² Department of Defense, *National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for Fiscal Year 2016*, 2-8. “Plan to Achieve Full Compatibility between AC and RC. The ARNG and USAR are operational components and they can continue to expect to serve together with AC units in any theater. The Army equips all ARFORGEN units with the most modern and most capable equipment available, based on the units’ mission. Because of this, the ARNG and USAR units receive the same equipment as their AC counterparts when assigned similar missions. The Army is also committed to fulfilling its DODI 1225.06 requirements to replace ARNG and USAR equipment transferred to the AC. At the time of this publication, the Army had reduced the number of items it owes the ARNG and USAR from over 85,000 to approximately 1,663 pieces of equipment. To ensure transparency, any new requirements must be accompanied with a memorandum of agreement signed by both the AC and ARNG or USAR and approved by the Secretary of Defense. Repayments are tracked item by item. Supplementary instructions providing Army procedures for implementing the changes are described in DODI 1225.06.”

¹¹³ Department of Defense, *National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for Fiscal Year 2015*, 2-15. “Due to the large amounts of equipment received in recent years and the anticipation of equipment returning from theater operations, the ARNG continues to manage readiness by prioritizing limited resources using the ARFORGEN cycle in support of the National Military Strategy. Additionally, extensive EOH data analyses and the launching of new, long-term equipping management initiatives allow the ARNG to better monitor equipment readiness and continually identify opportunities to improve EOH readiness.”

In conjunction with properly equipping the ARNG is the requirement to ensure the capability to maintain the equipment over time. The ARNG is underfunded and resourced to conduct required maintenance. Modernization and continued funding of surface equipment maintenance facilities and the Surface Depot Maintenance Program is required.¹¹⁴ Failing to adequately fund maintenance and the improvement of facilities risks reduced readiness and reduced equipment life cycles. In addition, full-time manning levels in the maintenance field, just like the rest of the ARNG full-time manning levels, have not kept pace with the operational tempo.¹¹⁵

Two improvements are required in how the ARNG is manned to better support the operational role. First, the fulltime force must be increased to 100 percent manning levels. The fulltime force supports administrative and readiness functions of the ARNG. Failing to adequately fill these positions reduces overall readiness. This significant expense should not be considered only against the cost to maintain a reduced fulltime manning level. The additional cost should be compared against the additional cost required to increase ARNG readiness for operational requirements. Failing to do so reduces the ARNG's capability to perform an operational role.¹¹⁶ The second improvement that will better enable the ARNG to perform an operational role is to ensure predictability through the ARFORGEN process. Cross leveling of soldiers late in the process reduces the ability to conduct collective training or prevents soldiers

¹¹⁴ Department of Defense, *National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for Fiscal Year 2015*, 2-14.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 2-15. “Unfortunately, full-time surface maintenance technician manning levels have not kept up with the increased levels of equipment and operating tempo. Funding for FY 2013 has filled only 75 percent of the ARNG’s established surface maintenance technician requirements”

¹¹⁶ John Pendleton, “GAO-09-898 Army Needs to Finalize an Implementation Plan and Funding Strategy for Sustaining an Operational Reserve Force,” 18. “The Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee, US Army Forces Command, and the Commission on National Guard and Reserves have reported that insufficient full-time support levels place the operational force at risk.”

from getting required MOS training.¹¹⁷

The ARNG along with the rest of the RC continue to support AC forces operating in the homeland and abroad. Over the last decade and a half of persistent conflict and many domestic support operations during the same period, ARNG forces demonstrated relevance through action and acquired skills important to the Nation's future security posture. Only by maximizing the use of available resources and identifying areas for improvement can the ARNG continue to maintain the capability to serve in strategic and, when needed, operational role into the next decade and beyond.

¹¹⁷ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 186.

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